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Executive Summary 
 
 
As resolved in H.P. 285 - L.D. 418 (Chapter 52) and requested by the Maine 
Legislature's Joint Standing Committee on Education and Cultural Affairs, the Maine 
Education Policy Research Institute (MEPRI) has conducted a study to examine current 
policies and investigate feasibility of using Social Impact Bonds as a funding mechanism 
for public education programs in Maine. There are currently various models, 
opportunities and challenges when considering the use of Social Impact Bonds to fund 
public education programming and innovation. Many insights are emerging from the 
existing models and recent programs in the United States and across the globe, some of 
which are achieving their outcomes and some that did not achieve their goals. 
 
A key component of the Social Impact Bond is developing a mutually beneficial contract 
for monetary lending with a private investor for a needed social service. Social Impact 
Bonds (SIBs) can offer critical initial resources to kick start innovative public services or 
pilot groundbreaking organizational structures for providing essential social services. 
However, SIBs are complex lending mechanisms with many partners, structural features 
and substantial financial investment. Lenders must be willing to engage in 
comparatively higher-risk investments. Service providers must be prepared for rigorous 
evaluation and possible identification of failure based on monetized, tightly-defined 
outcomes. Significant challenges can arise when considering all of these components of 
Social Impact Bonds, yet they may provide exciting opportunities for certain services 
and specific lenders. In addition, other existing examples of private-public agreements 
that may offer alternative methods for funding high-priority public education initiatives 
in Maine are also introduced in this report. 
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An Examination of Using Social Impact Bonds  
to Fund Education in Maine 
  
Erika Stump  Amy Johnson 
erika.stump@maine.edu amyj@maine.edu 
Study Purpose & Methods 
 
As resolved in H.P. 285 - L.D. 418 (Chapter 52) and requested by the Maine 
Legislature's Joint Standing Committee on Education and Cultural Affairs, the Maine 
Education Policy Research Institute (MEPRI) has conducted a study with the purpose of 
examining current policies and investigating the feasibility of using Social Impact Bonds 
as a funding mechanism for public education programs in Maine. MEPRI is a 
nonpartisan research institute funded jointly by the Maine State Legislature and the 
University of Maine System.  
 
To this end, this study of Social Impact Bonds utilized a review of existing research 
literature, published reports, and other relevant public documents. In addition, 
interviews were conducted with experts in related fields, including leaders in Maine 
economic development and philanthropic investment. Findings from these various 
sources were compiled into this final report. 
Defining Social Impact Bonds 
 
There are currently various models, opportunities and challenges when considering the 
use of Social Impact Bonds to fund public education programming and innovation. 
Many insights are emerging from the existing models and recent programs in the United 
States and across the globe, some of which are achieving their outcomes and some that 
did not achieve their goals. The distinction found in current Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) 
from traditional funding mechanisms is their use as a means to more immediately 
implement measures of "social innovation."  Situated within a broader category of “pay 
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for performance” or “pay for success” structures, a main goal is to "provide rapid and 
rigorous evidence about what works" and build collaboration among 
governments as well as nonprofit and for-profit partners to address social 
problems (Azemati et al., 2013; Crowe, Gash & Kippin, 2014).  
 
One key to embarking on the work to consider SIBs for funding education is to 
understand the core goals and needs of the recipients of the service being provided as 
well as the vision of the private investors, taxpayers, state officials and legislative leaders 
involved. However, there are some common components of many existing SIBs that can 
be used to guide consideration of engaging in such investment opportunities. Structural 
features, key players and service model qualities often found in existing SIBs or similar 
pay for performance contracts are discussed in the sections below. 
 
Common Structural Features 
 
There are some core elements of Social Impact Bonds, although model variations are 
evolving. In fact, SIBs are not necessarily even technically bonds in the traditional 
definition. SIBs may look more like a social impact investment, an equity investment, or 
a structured product than a municipal bond. Municipal market bonds are a loan 
scheduled for set period of time. They are bought and sold on the market. The borrower 
pays back the loan, with interest if paid back at maturity or without full interest if paid 
back early—making a profit or loss depending on activity in the market (Schultz, 2012).  
 
In contrast, pay for performance contracts, such as impact bonds, have been used in 
various social service arenas developed with fixed price and fixed outcomes that offer 
savings or profit contingent upon whether greater productivity or efficiency is achieved 
(Manso, 2011). Pay for performance structures include development impact bonds, 
social impact bonds, pay for success financing contracts or performance clauses within 
procured service agreements. Most of these financing models involve government 
agencies and have similar components that are mutually agreed-upon by the service 
providers, agencies and investors. The variations in name often refer to specific 
elements of the contract, targeted recipient (i.e. development impact bonds partner aid 
Social Impact Bonds - MEPRI 2016  3
agencies and private investors in a developing country context) or arenas of the service 
(e.g. construction, military defense, regional development, social services, etc.). Social 
Impact Bonds usually focus on social services and welfare in areas such as education, 
housing, criminal justice (reducing recidivism), and health.  
 
Payment for these service programs using Social Impact Bonds combines pay for 
performance and municipal bond structures: a private investor makes initial 
investment, and repayment is contingent upon agreed-upon metrics that vary 
by contract. These are usually short-term (usually 1-5 years) timeframes for realizing 
observable and measurable monetized outcomes, and the return on investment may 
be a social benefit but is calculated in monetary terms. While many venture market 
capital investors expect a return of up to twenty percent, SIB investments usually offer 
less than ten percent return (McKay, 2013). However, SIBs may also offer opportunities 
for investors to meet federal portfolio requirements, such as those identified under the 
Community Reinvestment Act (Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 
2015). 
 
The most common model of SIB requires the government or social welfare agency to 
engage and hire private-sector or non-profit organizations, who in turn raise capital 
for feasibility studies and operating costs. This organization then recruits 
investors, manages service providers, oversees funds, as well as contracts with a 
program evaluator. In some cases, one organization may provide all of these 
components, and in other models, numerous organizations are sub-contracted by one 
intermediary that manages these components. "The overhead costs of the SIB financing 
mechanism, including fees for legal counsel, intermediary costs, evaluation expenses, 
and costs associated with investor due diligence, are primarily fixed costs and will 
constitute a smaller proportion of the total project as the size of the intervention grows. 
In most cases, these costs are only worth incurring for a SIB contract worth at least $20 
million." (Azemati et al., 2013). The key players in most Social Impact Bond 
partnerships are outlined below. 
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Key Players 
1. Government Agencies  
a) Established, long-term mechanisms for paying service providers (full 
faith & credit authority to certain state officials), repaying investors 
and maintaining contracted services of intermediary must be in place. 
b) Sustained, multi-year attention and support from top officials in 
the state. Staff at state and local level dedicated specifically to the 
development, oversight and management of payments and services related 
to pay for success contracts.  
c) Capacity and expertise to gather rigorous evidence of program 
effectiveness in 1-3-year experimental study and spend at least one year 
conducting feasibility studies and cost-benefit analysis.  
d) Sometimes, it is necessary to raise matching funds from tax base. 
2. Policymakers 
a) Multi-year stability of infrastructure and repayment capacity not 
dependent upon specific individuals remaining in office or annual 
"appropriations risk" (for example, legislation to develop a dedicated 
"sinking fund" or "trust") is necessary to ensure program sustainability. 
b) Legislation offering full faith & credit authority for certain state 
officials enables leaders to engage in pay for performance contracts.  
3. Private-sector Investor 
a) Principal lender offering initial funding for service; investment may 
meet lender's federal Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) portfolio 
requirements. 
b) Subordinate lenders, guarantors or philanthropic insurers provide 
insurance for primary lender in the case that a return on investment is not 
realized, may fund supporting structures (initial research, feasibility 
studies, payments to intermediary, etc.) or finance upstart costs.  
4. Transaction Coordinator or Intermediary Organization 
a) Manages funds. 
b) Structures contracts. 
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c) Raises capital for preliminary feasibility studies, evidence-based program 
model studies, proposal development and submission, and evaluator. 
d) Government agency usually pays out-of-pocket or solicits 
sponsoring funds to cover the operating costs and fees of the 
intermediary organization. 
5. Service Provider  
a) Must have proven experience and success in service delivery. 
b) Capacity to collect and analyze clearly measured data is necessary 
for program evaluation. 
c) Ability to scale up over time is often considered to identify long-term 
sustainability. 
6. External Evaluator 
a) Determines "success" of services based on repayment criteria developed by 
investor lending the monies and public entity borrowing the monies. 
b) The government agency usually pays out-of-pocket or solicits 
sponsoring funds from subsidiary investors to cover the costs and fees 
of evaluation. 
 
Service Program Model Selection 
 
There are various organizations offering recommendations and technical support for 
developing SIBs or pay for success (PFS) contracts that would both be beneficial to the 
service recipients and offer a profit for the investors. To be a successful investment, the 
social service, innovation, or intervention to be provided must have a demonstrated 
track record of producing results and be well-implemented. Organizations supporting 
the development of SIBs--such as Harvard Kennedy School's Government Performance 
Lab, the Nonprofit Finance Fund, and the Corporation for National and Community 
Service's Social Innovation Fund--recommend some common characteristics of feasible 
and impactful service program models: 
a) Selection of the program model to deliver service must be determined with 
prior evidence-based success using rigorous methods (usually random 
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control trial or quasi-experimental studies conducted using the 
selected program and very similar sample). 
b) Outcomes must be clearly measured and monetized to determine 
primary investment and monetary return if successful. 
c) Service should focus on prevention or early intervention for greatest 
social return. 
d) Service program model established in research must be replicable by other 
providers and scalable to greater numbers of service recipients. 
e) Service usually offers alternative approaches to current social 
problems or scale up successful programs instead of paying for 
government programs currently funded by taxpayers. 
 
Recommendations change over time as new, original investment structures are 
emerging and evaluation of the active pay for performance models is developing. 
However, these considerations appear to be important in creating a SIB model that 
promotes social innovation, serves the participants in need, provides a worthwhile 
investment of taxpayer dollars and offers a return on private investments. 
Financial Benefits & Considerations 
 
A key component of the Social Impact Bond is developing a mutually beneficial contract 
for monetary lending from a private investor for a needed social service. Many venture 
market capitalists engage in substantial investment in "pilot" programs that encourage 
the development of innovative services or organizational structures to people who need 
them the most. However, in order to best serve the recipients, it is often important that 
the concept potentially offers long-lasting positive effects that can eventually be 
independently sustainable after the initial investments have expired (Ederer & 
Manso, 2009). 
 
A key to maintaining the credibility of these private-public partnerships is that investors 
see a return on their investment and that the market structures can offer a solution to 
existing "broken" social service structures. Some investors may be willing to tolerate 
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greater risk for innovative projects offering critical social services. However, programs 
deemed "unsuccessful" due to failing to meet outcome goals could present 
challenging public relations situations as well as jeopardize future support 
from certain organizations and other funding sources. 
 
For these reasons, private investors often require that the pay for success contracts 
include attainable outcome measures and a manageable return on investment interest 
rate (4-10%). Primary lenders regularly depend upon the insurance of subsidiary 
guarantors to recover their investment if the established outcomes are not met. In the 
existing SIB examples in the U.S., the guarantor role has been filled by philanthropic 
organizations or private investors who essentially act as underwriters to absorb any 
investment losses. In addition, SIBs, pay for success contracts and other socially-
responsible investments that offer local benefits can fulfill federal Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) requirements intended to encourage depository 
institutions to help meet the credit needs of the communities in which they operate. 
"The CRA requires that each insured depository institution's record in helping meet the 
credit needs of its entire community be evaluated periodically. That record is taken into 
account [by supervising federal agencies] in considering an institution's application for 
deposit facilities, including mergers and acquisitions" (Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council, 2015). 
 
Such investments from the private sector can in turn offer support for programming not 
able to be funded with existing budgetary restraints. Pay for performance agreements 
can leverage private capital to explore innovative ideas that will offer models for future 
programming or, if not successful, do not require the government to pay for the service 
(Gustafsson-Wright, Golden & Aigner-Treworgy, 2015). However, overhead costs and 
intermediary services are not typically part of the "success" payment structure, so 
funding to study feasibility, manage capital, and organize the various players must still 
be raised or dedicated. In fact, some analysts argue that performance-based investments 
often require short-term outcome measures that hinder creativity built on learning from 
early failures to create long-term success (Ederer & Manso, 2009). Therefore, many 
organizations promoting the use of pay for performance contracts and SIBs emphasize 
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the importance of developing agreements that promote sustainable opportunities with 
tolerance for the risk inherent in innovation. 
Current Uses of Social Impact Bonds 
 
Social Impact Bonds began to gain popularity several years ago in the United Kingdom. 
To date, there have been sixteen SIBs in the U.K., two in Australia and one each in 
various other countries, including Canada, Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and India. 
There are currently five established Social Impact Bond projects that are either 
underway or have come to fruition in the United States involving programs reducing 
juvenile recidivism or expanding public pre-schooling.  
 
In Maine, pay for performance structures have been explored for partnerships providing 
transportation for health care, although these contracts were developed between private 
organizations, not government agencies. There has also been interest expressed in 
expanding early learning opportunities, funding housing for Maine's aging population, 
improving food security, providing in-school health care (community schools) and social 
programs sponsored by Maine-based corporations. 
 
High Priority Areas of Investment 
 
Social Impact Bonds have received great attention since 2010 in the United Kingdom, 
Europe, Canada, the United States and across the globe. However, pay for success (PFS) 
or performance clauses have been used in government contracts for decades. When 
using these methods as a funding mechanism for public education programs, it is 
important to have support from investors, top government officials and taxpaying 
citizens to realize a successful PFS program. Therefore, local or regional priorities may 
vary from the recommendations at the national level. However, the following areas have 
been identified by the federal government, supporting organizations and key investors 
as top priorities with high impact potential: 
 Criminal Justice 
 Homelessness 
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 Early Childhood Education 
 Workforce Development 
This identification has been reinforced by the issues addressed in the United States' five 
established SIBs in New York (New York City and statewide), Utah, Illinois (Chicago), 
and Massachusetts. These SIBs have either related to programs reducing juvenile 
recidivism or expanding public pre-schooling. In addition, eighteen states have 
passed related legislation and/or begun conducting feasibility studies to explore using 
PFS or SIB funding mechanisms for various other areas of social service. 
 
State & Federal Legislation 
 
In the United States, federal legislation (HR 4885 - Social Impact Bond Act) was 
introduced in 2014 by Indiana Rep. Todd Young that "required Secretary of Treasury to 
seek proposals from states or local governments for SIB projects." It included $300 
million in supporting funds and was referred to Committee on Ways and Means but 
died in Congress. In 2015, Rep. Young introduced HR 1336 - Social Impact 
Partnership Act that required the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to 
seek proposals from states or local governments for SIB projects, funded feasibility 
studies and established a related council. This bill was introduced in March and referred 
to the Committee on Ways and Means. 
 
Many states have begun exploring the possibilities of SIBs with proposed legislation and 
state-funded feasibility studies. Related legislation has been introduced related to SIBs 
or PFS models in the following states: NB, NJ (pocket vetoed), OK, RI, TX, VT, and WA. 
Legislation was passed enabling state to enter into SIB or PFS contracts in 
CT, MA, OK, PA, WA, and UT. Feasibility studies have been or are being conducted 
in AZ, CA, CO*, CT*, HI, IL*, MA*, MI*, NY*, NJ, OH*, SC*, UT, DC. Several of these 
studies (*) were selected to receive technical support from the Harvard Kennedy 
School's Government Performance Lab (formerly named the Harvard SIB Lab), which is 
in part funded by federal Social Innovation Fund grants and other private investors 
(including Bloomberg, Rockefeller and Pritzker). 
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The first SIB in the United States started a few years ago involving a juvenile recidivism 
reduction program at Rikers Island in New York. Since then, similar programs involving 
juvenile recidivism reduction and homelessness have been established in 
Massachusetts and New York state. (See Appendix A for profiles of the Rikers Island and 
Massachusetts SIB projects.) In addition, SIBs focusing on reducing special education 
rates and improving student achievement through increased preschool 
programming are in progress in Utah and Illinois (Chicago) and described below. 
 
Profiles of Social Impact Bonds Funding Education in U.S. 
 
The following profiles outline the two current programs in the United States using SIBs 
to fund education initiatives. (See Appendix A for profiles of two non-education SIBs 
established in the U.S.): 
 
Chicago 2014 - Expansion of Child-Parent Center (CPC) Early Childhood 
Program 
In 2012, Human Capital Research Collaborative (HCRC) at University of Minnesota 
received a grant from the U.S. Department of Education's Investing in Innovation Fund 
(i3) to expand their Child-Parent Center to three public schools in Chicago. Building on 
these resources, the following SIB project was developed: 
I. Service Program 
a. Service provider: Six public schools (3 part of i3 grant, 2 currently 
implementing CPC, 1 new school) serving low-income communities w/ 
shortage of Pre-K openings due to lack of funding. 
b. Target Sample: 2,620 public school children over 4 years (approx. 1/2 of 
Chicago eligible children). 
c. Program Goals: Increase K readiness, improve g3 literacy & reduce 
special education services. 
d. Program Model: Child-Parent Center model that provides half-day 
preschool & parent support programs as a PK to g3 intervention. 
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II. Funding 
a. Repayment will be $2,900 for each school-ready kindergartener from 
programs + $750 for each literacy-proficient child in g3 + $9,100 for each 
year a CPC participant avoids special education services. 
b. Cost-Benefit Analysis: HCRC 
c. Funders: 
 Goldman Sachs Social Impact Fund $7.4 million senior loan financing 
 Northern Trust Corp $5.4 million senior lender (community 
development portfolio investment - Chicago HQs) 
 JB & MK Pritzker Family Foundation $4 million subordinate lender 
(community development portfolio investment - Chicago HQs) 
 City of Chicago & Chicago Public Schools $9.4 million 
 State of Illinois $4.5 million 
 Finnegan Family Foundation - funding program evaluation, years 1 & 2 
d. Project Funds Coordinator: Illinois Facilities Fund 
III. Contract and Service Management  
a. Community Intermediary & Recruitment: Metropolitan Family Services 
b. Program Evaluator - TBD 
c. Technical Assistance - Harvard Kennedy School SIB Technical Assistance 
Lab (procurement & data analysis) 
 
The Utah High Quality Preschool Program 2014 - Early Childhood 
Education 
In March 2014, UT Legislature passed HB96 Utah School Readiness Initiative allocating 
funds to support quality grants to local education agencies and private providers to 
increase the quality of EC programming and allow the Board to enter into PFS financing 
contracts with private investors on behalf of the State. With this action, the following 
SIB project was developed: 
I. Service Program 
a. Service Provider: Granite School District, Park City School District, YMCA 
of Northern Utah, Guadalupe School & two private childcare providers 
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b. Target Sample: Year One 595 3- and 4-year-olds attending preschools 
who would have otherwise been waitlisted (up to five cohorts = 3,500 
children) 
c. Program Goals: Each student identified prior to kindergarten by a 
standardized test (Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test) as below average and 
therefore predicted to use special education and remedial services in grade 
school who is not deemed eligible for special education services in the 
given year is considered "success." 
d. Program Model: Voices for Utah Children and Granite School District 
targeted pre-kindergarten curriculum to increase school readiness and 
academic performance, established success with experimental research. 
II. Funding 
a. Total savings for Year One calculated as $281,550 ($2,607 per child fixed 
per annum payment allocated for special education by State for 110 
children identified by predictive testing). 
b. 95% of savings + interest rate of 5% ($2,470) paid to investor for each 
predicted child that does not receive special education services in that 
school year grades K-6 until loan + 5% interest is repaid then 40% of 
savings ($1,040) from grade K-6 of remaining participants; Utah will 
retain 100% of savings on grades 7-12. 
c. Funders 
 Goldman Sachs (headquarters located in Salt Lake City) $4.6 
million senior loan financing through Social Impact Fund, 5% 
interest rate 
 J.B. Pritzker $2.4 million junior loan financing 
 United Way of Salt Lake $1 million grant for 1st cohort 
 Salt Lake County $350,000 grant for 1st cohort 
 State of Utah repayment funding for cohorts 2-5 
III. Contract and Service Management  
a. Research & Analytic Support - Voices for Utah Children 
b. Training and Professional Development - Granite School District 
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c. Performance Account Manager - Park City Community Foundation 
 
Outcomes of Year One (2014-2015) indicated that 109 of 110 children predicted to 
utilize special education services did not use special education services in kindergarten. 
Therefore, the program was evaluated as being successful, and Salt Lake County United 
Way paid 95% of realized savings ($267,000) to Goldman Sachs. 
Considerations for SIBs in Maine 
 
Recent legislation and related investment projects in Maine have focused consideration 
of using Social Impact Bonds to fund the expansion of extended learning programs and 
early childhood education for Maine's children. Therefore, this report also examines the 
potential and challenges in considering SIBs to fund these specific educational 
opportunities. 
 
Extended Learning Opportunities 
 
The Report of the Commission to Study the Adequacy and Equity of Certain Cost 
Components of the School Funding Formula (2014) provides a review of national 
research literature and the results of a study completed by the Maine Education Policy 
Research Institute with Maine school districts examining impacts and costs of extended 
learning programs, specifically summer school opportunities. A key consideration from 
analysis of both Maine and national data regarding extended learning programs is that 
there is substantial variation in the types of existing programs offered with 
various levels of understanding about the direct impact and outcomes of these 
programs. While HP 285-LD 418 defines an extended learning program as "a program 
that creates educational opportunities for students whose educational needs and 
abilities exceed those addressed by the general curriculum," this definition could 
encompass a wide variety of programming including special education services, non-
special education academic or social interventions provided during school hours, after-
school programming, summer schools and individual tutoring.  
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There are no models of existing SIBs that specifically target extended 
learning programs, although general education outcomes of retention and 
enrollment have been explored in proposed SIBs or countries outside the U.S. 
Therefore, if developing a SIB as a funding mechanism for extended learning programs 
in Maine, it would be necessary to establish specific, monetized outcomes in a focused 
evidence-based program model that would have the potential for scaling-up.  Based on 
the literature review conducted for the above-referenced MEPRI report, summer school 
programs may be more likely to show impacts with short-term monetizable savings than 
would before-school or after-school programming.  However, as the terms of SIBs are 
ultimately determined between the funder and the government agency, this may depend 
on the priorities of potential investors and other key players.   
 
Furthermore, it should be noted that some possible efficiencies within extended 
learning programs may be achieved within areas of programming outside education, 
such as Maine's Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).  For example, 
providing extended-day school programs may decrease DHHS payments for child care 
subsidies or child care tax deductions for eligible taxpayers. This suggests that 
implementing SIBs for this targeted outcome in Maine may need broad cooperation 
across multiple state agencies.  
 
Pre-kindergarten Education 
 
Maine has seen significant recent investment on increasing early learning and 
pre-kindergarten education. This work has included concerted local funding and 
programming in certain geographic regions as well as significant statewide 
implementation of public preschooling supported by grant monies from the U.S. 
Department of Education. The Report of the Commission to Study the Adequacy and 
Equity of Certain Cost Components of the School Funding Formula (2014) includes the 
Maine Education Policy Research Institute's examination of enrollment and cost 
elements involved with expanding or starting preschool programming in public school 
districts. 
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CareQuilt, Educare Central Maine and Kennebec Valley Community Action Program 
were recently awarded a $6 million federal grant over five years (2015-2020) to provide 
72 additional low-income children and families with early childhood learning 
opportunities. The funds also support programming to raise the quality and scope of 
instructional preschool practices of 20 providers in both center-based and family child 
care settings in northern Kennebec, Somerset, Piscataquis, and Penobscot communities. 
The Maine Early Learning Investment Group added $670,000 in matching funds and 
received new market tax credits for their investment. In addition, the Maine Shared 
Services Alliance (MSSA) engaged over 200 providers statewide to offer support that 
would improve the financial stability and improve the quality of early care and 
education services. MSSA is funded by the John T. Gorman Foundation, The Davis 
Family Foundation, Jane’s Trust, The Samuel Cohen Foundation and The Betterment 
Fund, among others. The service program was developed from Educare Central Maine's 
two-year pilot in which five school districts in Maine collaborated to research and 
implement an evidence-based common screening process for school-readiness 
benchmarks statewide. The results of the pilot were published in the Common 
Kindergarten Screening Pilot Report (2014). 
 
In 2014, the State of Maine Department of Education received a $14.8 million 
Preschool Expansion Grant from the U.S. Department of Education to 
expand preschool offerings through the year 2019. At the time, 205 public preschool 
classrooms existed in Maine, and at least 34 new classrooms are scheduled to be added 
from 12 different school districts serving approximately 750 children in addition to the 
5,000 students currently enrolled in 4-year-old or early kindergarten programs. As well, 
approximately 25 classrooms already in operation will be expanded so students can 
attend five days a week for the full day.  
 
In 2013-14, approximately 13,500 students were enrolled in Maine public kindergarten. 
This suggests that current pre-kindergarten enrollment in public preschools served less 
than 40% of Maine's eligible children. However, this enrollment count did not include 
federally funded Early Head Start or private early learning programs such as those in 
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Central Maine mentioned above.  It also does not include the additional programs added 
since 2014.  
 
Therefore, exploration of using SIB funding mechanisms for expanding pre-
kindergarten programs in Maine should determine the number of students not enrolled 
in any type of early learning program to examine the unmet need for pre-kindergarten 
programming considering recent initiatives. Interest has been expressed by members of 
the Maine Early Learning Investment Group in identifying other geographic regions 
with lower pre-kindergarten enrollment rates. Exploration of collaboration or 
coordination with established investing networks and existing programs might reveal 
the possibility of matching funds, increased services or complementary opportunities in 
regions of Maine needing improved and increased early childhood learning experiences.  
 
Considerations for Rural States 
 
There are some recommended components of developing a successful SIB that would 
require special deliberation in a geographically disparate state with a limited number of 
large foundations or depository institutions, such as Maine: 
A. A large sample size (200+ students) is necessary for experimental design to 
establish a targeted program for replication in a proposed SIB model. 
B. A large full sample size (200+ students) is also necessary to receive annual 
service within SIB timeframe (usually 1-5 years) in order to determine "success" 
of the target sample (100+ students). 
C. Capacity among local service providers and state agencies must exist to scale up 
an initial program for the duration of the SIB and continue after the maturation 
of the initial investment. This should include sufficient staffing levels, on-going 
professional development, and physical infrastructures. 
D. Existing (or resources to build) staffing and expertise in cost-benefit analysis, 
incentive contracting, program monitoring, program evaluation or funding to 
outsource intermediary oversight must be available to support the development 
and implementation of the service and financing. It is often recommended that 
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staff within the government agency and service provider be dedicated to these 
tasks to collaborate with intermediary personnel. 
E. Primary lenders, subsidiary guarantors and matching funds grantors must be 
willing to invest adequate funds to support the development, initial realization 
and implementation of the service throughout the duration of the SIB contracted 
timeframe. Government should be prepared to assume the costs of sustaining a 
successful program after the maturation of the SIB contract. 
 
Some of these constraints may be relaxed if agreeable to all stakeholders.  For example, 
certain existing SIBs (such as Utah's "High Quality Preschool Program") have developed 
mutually agreed-upon contracts that do not fulfill all of these recommended elements. 
Some components that vary from these recommendations have come under public 
scrutiny (Garrett, 2015; Popper, 2015). However, local key players in Maine may 
develop unique pay for performance agreements that appropriately address regional 
needs and leverage the local resources available. 
Recommendations 
 
Private-Public Funding Partnerships 
 
Social Impact Bonds can offer critical initial resources to kick start innovative public 
services or pilot groundbreaking organizational structures for providing essential social 
services, such as public education. However, SIBs are complex lending mechanisms with 
many partners and substantial financial investment. These are lending structures in 
which either the public partner re-pays a loan with interest (usually using shareholder 
or taxpayer monies) or identifies the program as failed. Lenders must be willing to 
engage in these high-risk investments. Service providers must be prepared for 
evaluation and possible identification of failure based on monetized, tightly-defined 
outcomes. Significant challenges can arise when considering all of these components of 
pay for performance contracts (Ederer & Manso, 2009; Rosenman, 2014) or Social 
Impact Bonds (Pauly & Swanson, 2013). 
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Therefore, it is often recommended that private-public partnerships for funding social 
services such as education should focus on the program being provided and determine a 
funding structure that is a best fit for all key participants (National Development 
Council, 2015). Social Impact Bonds certainly may provide this structure for certain 
programs and specific lenders, but there are also other existing private-public 
relationships with alternative structures for funding high-priority public education 
initiatives. These include: 
 Private foundation grants and matching funds, 
 Municipal bonds, 
 New market tax credits, 
 Pay for performance or pay for success contracts, 
 Public-private partnerships, 
 Social impact investments, 
 Equity investments, and 
 Structured products. 
Depending on scale, scope, and nature of the specific education program desired, an 
alternative structure such as those listed above may be better suited to the needs of 
investors, service providers, governmental agents, and policymakers involved. 
 
Policy Recommendations 
 
With careful consideration of the educational benefits for children in Maine and 
thorough deliberation of the necessary investments or requirements of specific lending 
structures, Social Impact Bonds and pay for performance models could offer valuable 
funding opportunities. The following recommendations are offered to guide potential 
work in developing policies and building necessary public awareness to allow for the 
creation of such structures.  
1) Create legislation that a) enables officials to enter pay for performance contracts 
and b) secures funding for development and repayment of such contracts.  
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2) Use rigorous research findings to select a targeted educational service that is an 
area of need in Maine or a specified region of the state and would result in 
positive and monetizable results.  
3) Engage key private partners to discuss potential areas of service and financing 
structures. 
4) Identify dedicated capacity within government agencies, especially the Maine 
Department of Education. 
Conclusion 
 
There are various possibilities for developing private-public partnerships to fund 
effective practices that improve the educational opportunities for Maine's public school 
systems and the children who attend them, including the use of Social Impact Bonds. 
Keys to creating a successful partnership are understanding the goals of all stakeholders 
and remaining true to the essential outcome: improving the lives and educational 
experiences of Maine's children.  
 
Sustained, multi-year attention and support from top officials in the state and service 
providers in the region, county, city or town is critical. Also, staff at state and local level 
must be dedicated specifically to the development, oversight and management of 
payments and services related to pay for success contracts. In addition, there must be 
the capacity and expertise to gather rigorous evidence of program effectiveness in 
experimental and feasibility studies and cost-benefit analysis.  
 
Policymakers may establish legislation giving full faith and credit authority for 
payments and setting up a sinking fund to maintain reliable payment capability over the 
life of a lending agreement. This can allay potential investor concerns about the risk of 
depending on a future legislature to appropriate disbursements at maturation. However, 
a realistic vision must encompass access to markets, service and product supply chains, 
in addition to substantial monetary commitment, from a primary lender and subsidiary 
guarantors that are interested in innovative education initiatives and tolerant of 
financial risk. In addition, average cost savings from the "success" measure must be 
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substantial enough to balance the costs of development and implementation if those are 
not subsidized by secondary investors. A scale-up design should consider geography, 
time, and service provider capacity and have a sustainability plan for implementation 
after the terms of the SIB expire. Furthermore, it is important to consider diminishing 
returns even of a successful program. 
 
If these critical components are recognized and guide the development process, Social 
Impact Bonds and pay for performance contract-structured funding have the potential 
to provide support for Maine's public education programs and initiate innovative 
approaches to educational needs in the state.  
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Appendix A - U.S. (non-education) Social Impact Bond 
Profiles 
 
 
Massachusetts 2014 - Reduce Recidivism in Justice-involved Youth 
 2012 State of Massachusetts Legislature authorized Secretary of Administration 
and Finance to enter into pay for success contracts, with up to $50 million in 
success payments backed by the full faith and credit of Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts and created the Social Innovation Investment Trust Fund. Using 
this foundation , the Massachusetts Juvenile Justice Pay for Success Initiative 
was launched in January 2014: 
o Service Program 
 Service Provider: Roca, Inc. is a nonprofit organization offering 
juvenile justice intervention programming with at 25-year history of 
reducing incarceration rates. 
 Target Sample: 929 at risk males age 17-24 in or exiting juvenile 
justice system in MA. 
 Program Goals: Reduce the number of days participants spend in 
prison, improved job readiness & increased employment rates. 
 Program Services: Street outreach, targeted life skills, education, 
employment preparation involving two years of programming and 
two years of follow-up support services. 
o Funding 
 U.S. Department of Labor awarded MA Juvenile Justice PFS 
Initiative a grant of $11.7 million and additional funding for success 
payments over nine years. 
 Service provider (Roca) deferred $3.26 million (15%) of service fees 
until success is determined. 
 Project Intermediary (Third Sector Capital Partners, Inc.) deferred 
15% of service fees until success is determined. 
 Upon achieving higher levels of success, funders receive percentage 
of return of "savings." 
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 Funders 
 Goldman Sachs - $8 million senior loan financing through 
Social Impact Fund 
 The Kresge Foundation - $1.33 million junior loan financing 
 Living Cities - $1.33 million junior loan financing 
 Laura & John Arnold Foundation - $3.34 million grant 
 New Profit - $1.81 million grant 
 The Boston Foundation - $300,000 grant 
o Independent & Statistical Evaluator - The Urban Institute, conducting 
randomized control trials to determine impact of service 
o Project Intermediary - Third Sector Capital Partners, Inc. 
o Independent Validator - Public Consulting Group, assessing evaluation 
methodology and verify service outcomes 
o Technical Assistance (procurement & data analysis) - Harvard Kennedy 
School SIB Technical Assistance Lab  
 
New York City 2013 - Adolescent Behavioral Learning Experience  
 
o Service Program 
 Service Provider: Osborne Association & Friends of Island 
Academy 
 Target Sample: 4,000 men, age 16-18 detained at Rikers Island 
 Program Goal: Reduce recidivism by 10% 
 Service: Three-year intervention of Moral Reconation (cognitive 
behavioral) Therapy, which previously demonstrated positive 
outcomes in RCTs, to improve social skills, personal responsibility 
and decision making. 
o Funding 
 Project Intermediary (set up financial arrangements, selected 
intervention & service provider, trained staff, piloted intervention, 
monitored program fidelity and participation, repays loans to 
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primary funder) - MDRC (formerly Manpower Demonstration 
Research Corporation) 
 Funders 
 Goldman Sachs - $9.6 million senior loan financing, 
repayment structure includes ROI based on 
performance/savings 
 Bloomberg Philanthropies - $7.2 million grant to MDRC to 
guarantee Sachs loan (if goals not met) or reprogram future 
efforts (if goals are met) & pays MDRC for pilot and 
intermediary costs 
 New York Mayor's Office - evaluation costs 
o Independent & Statistical Evaluators (quasi-experimental evaluation) - 
Vera Institute of Justice  
o Technical Assistance - Harvard Kennedy School SIB Technical Assistance 
Lab  
Outcomes demonstrated that 87% of incarcerated target population attended at least 
one session of program, and 44% reached "programmatic milestone." This resulted 
in an 8.5% rate of recidivism, falling short of the 10% goal. On August 31, 2015, the 
Adolescent Behavioral Learning Experience programming funding ended and 
services were no longer provided to the Rikers Island detainees. 
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